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The Fundamental Law That Shapes the United
States Health Care System: Is Universal Health
Care Realistic Within the Established Paradigm?
William P. Gunnar,M.D.*
"The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread,"
Anatole France, Le Lys Rouge, ch. VII (1894).1
I. INTRODUCTION

Between 1993 and 2002, I was a partner and physician employee for a
private practice group operating in the Chicagoland area. My medical staff
privileges at a number of inner city and suburban hospitals required that I
provide emergency services regardless of a patient's ability to reimburse me
for those services. My privileges were also contingent upon a guarantee
that I accept Medicaid reimbursement schedules for patients with Medicaid
coverage. Further, due to the nature of my hospital-based surgical practice,
I accepted referrals of all patients on a non-emergency basis regardless of
their ability to pay. The moral and ethical philosophy of the private practice
group that billed and collected for my services was to provide medical care
to all patients that required our services.
The patient population to whom my partners and I provided health care
services resulted in a substantial rate of non-reimbursement.
Approximately 10% of the patients receiving health care services were selfpay, which usually resulted in no pay. The business manager of our office
would negotiate Medicare reimbursement rates with many of these patients
and place them on a monthly payment plan. A few patients faithfully
mailed twenty to thirty dollars per month for years until their obligation was
met. The vast majority of self-pay patients were never heard from again
and after six months of unreturned calls and unanswered requests by mail,
4th year law student, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, Part-Time Evening
Division, and Associate Professor of Surgery, Loyola University Stritch School of
Medicine.
1. Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 588, n.32 (2d Cir. 2001).
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the patient's outstanding responsibility was written off as non-compensated
care. In addition, turning these patients over to a collection agency rarely
returned a payment.
Medicaid covered twenty-five percent of the patients receiving medical
services from our medical practice. Medicaid reimbursement for medical
services, as determined by the federal government and the state of Illinois,
approximated one-third of Medicare reimbursement rates. Despite the fact
that our business office would bill electronically within days of providing
medical service, we did not receive payment from the Illinois Department
of Public Aid for months.
For every one hundred patients that our private practice group serviced,
we collected approximately fifty Medicare reimbursements, fifteen
reimbursements from employee-based health plans (typically Medicare
rates plus 10-20%), twenty reimbursements from Medicaid, and no
reimbursement from ten self-pay patients. As Medicare reimbursements for
physicians declined in the 1990s and overhead costs of doing business
(including medical malpractice insurance premiums, staff salaries and
benefits, and supplies and equipment) continued to rise, 2 it became
increasingly more difficult to provide services to self-pay and Medicaid
patients from a financial perspective. Sometime in 2001, I began to ask
myself two questions: First, "should I refuse to provide health care services
to a patient that I know will not be able to pay me?" And second, "who
works for free without volunteering?"
My experience providing health care services in the Chicago "free
market" has proven to me that the uninsured person seeking health care in
the United States is not denied physical access to health care. For example,
any person can walk into a hospital or physician's office and request health
care services, regardless of whether that person has health insurance.
However, the uninsured patient faces two barriers when accessing the
health care system.
First, a health care provider may refuse health care services to any person
requesting preventive or non-emergency care who fails to provide proof of
guaranteed payment. In such situations, any moral or ethical considerations
for the person denied care because of their inability to pay are moot,
considering the free market of health care in the United States.
Second, the uninsured patient, often with limited access to resources, will
avoid seeking non-emergency and preventive care due to the cost and the
penalties associated with non-payment. Any person accessing the health
care system without proof of insurance coverage has the option of

2. William P. Gunnar, Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising Medical Malpractice
Premiums?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 465, 467-76 (2004).
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guaranteeing full payment or negotiating a discounted rate and delayed
payment schedule. In this respect, a contractual agreement to receive health
care services is quite similar to, for instance, purchasing a car. Under the
terms of the contract, failure to reimburse the physician or facility for
services rendered will result in billing requests and demands for payment
with the possibility of collection and legal action in the event of nonpayment.
From the perspective of the physician, providing health care services to
the uninsured person has an economic impact on both the physician's
practice and personal income. Rendering free care is essentially a tax
imposed on that practice and income with virtually no form of relief or
consideration. Historically, physicians could offset charitable care from
collections received for health care services provided to patients with
Medicare or traditional employee-based health insurance coverage. But the
health care system has changed over the past decade, resulting in decreased
physician reimbursement rates from Medicare, Medicaid, and employeebased health plans.
In addition to decreased reimbursement rates,
physicians are also facing increased physician practice overhead expenses,
particularly in relation to professional liability insurance rates. 3 Thus,
providing health care services to an uninsured patient now has a
substantially greater economic impact on the physician provider than it did
a decade ago.
Second, the physician practice incurs costs associated with the billing
and collection of payment from the uninsured patient. In the case of
nonpayment, the repeated phone calls, mailing of statements, and requests
for reimbursement take up a substantial amount of time and energy of the
office staff. In the event of a delayed payment schedule, the office staff
monitors the payment plan and allows the patient's billing file to remain
open for months or even years. Further, sending the patient's unpaid bills
to collection requires a second contractual arrangement with a collection
agency that guarantees a fifty percent return to the collection agency for any
payment recovered.
Third, in some cases, the physician health care provider is often
pressured to provide services to the uninsured or public aid patient. For
example, I was obligated to provide the following services for rates lower
than those paid by Medicare: 1) emergency care to an uninsured patient
presenting to a hospital emergency department; 2) all health care services
provided to a Medicaid patient under an agreement with the hospital to
"opt-in" to a federal reimbursement program for Medicare and Medicaid;
and 3) all health care services provided to an uninsured patient who was
3.

Id. at 467-76.
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admitted to the hospital in need of care, where any refusal to provide
services would violate the reasonable standard of care as well as the
hospital bylaws.
Fourth, the uninsured patient presenting to the hospital often suffers from
advanced disease as well as significant co-morbid conditions. In my
experience, patients with advanced disease typically require prolonged
hospitalization, greater time and effort from their treating physicians, as
well as substantial use of resources. Such services provided to the
uninsured patient detract from those physician activities directed at
enhancing the overall practice income through the care and treatment of
patients from whom one expects acceptable reimbursement.
This commentary will provide an overview of the laws that impact the
delivery of health care services provided to individuals without health
insurance coverage. It will also provide an understanding of the legal
foundation upon which the U.S. health care system rests and the forces that
are resistant to change within that system. Universal health care, or the
provision of health care services to all persons, is a laudable goal but
unobtainable within the current paradigm. Part II provides a brief overview
of the uninsured population and the impact that a lack of health care
insurance coverage has on that population.
Part III outlines the
constitutional importance and judicial interpretation of those statutes that
impact an individual's right to health care services. Part IV examines the
legislative intent behind federal statutes that either qualify or deny an
individual the right to receive federal and/or state health care funding. Part
V explores the social contract that continues between the uninsured patient
and the health care provider as well as outlines any incentives that exist for
the health care provider in delivering charitable health care. Finally, Part
VI summarizes the constitutional and legislative forces that are resistant to
changing the U.S. health care system and ultimately concludes that
universal health care in this country can never be fully achieved.
II. A

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE UNINSURED PERSON AND THE EFFECT THAT
A LACK OF HEALTH CARE COVERAGE HAS ON OVERALL HEALTH

Current estimates of the number of U.S. citizens that lack health
insurance have increased to forty-five million, nine million of whom are
children.4 The uninsured represent 18% of the nonelderly population5 and
4. See KAISFR COMM'N ON KEY FACTS, HENRY J. KAISER FOUND., THE UNINSURED AND
THEIR ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&Page
ID=49531 [hereinafter KAISER
REPOR ]; see also ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED: A

VIEW FROM THE STATES (May 2004), available at http://www.rwjf.org/research/research
detail.jsp?id = 1882&ia- 132 [hereinafter JOHNSON REPORT].
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the percentage of uninsured adults varies by state, ranging from a low of
7.8% in Minnesota to 31.2% in Texas,6 with almost one-half of the
uninsured residing in only five states . In addition, the vast majority of
uninsured working adults are black and Hispanic; only 11% are white. 8
In addition to uninsured citizens, thirty-three million non-citizen
immigrants currently reside in the United States, about nine million of
whom are here illegally and are presumed to be uninsured. 9 The number of
illegal immigrants is expected to increase by 500,000 per year,'0 with
approximately one-half arriving from Mexico."
The lack of health care insurance coverage establishes considerable
barriers to health care.' 2 Persons without health insurance are more likely
to postpone seeking health care and avoid filling prescriptions because of
the cost, have problems paying their medical bills, and nearly a quarter of
them will be contacted by a collection agency.' 3 Additionally, in 2003
approximately one-third of all uninsured persons who needed health care
14
did not receive it.
Persons that delay or fail to receive timely health care
are more likely to develop serious illness, become hospitalized for
conditions that could have been avoided, and ultimately die.' 5 A report by
the Institute of Medicine estimated that at least 18,000 U.S.
citizens die
6
prematurely each year due to a lack of health care coverage.

5.

KAISER REPORT, supra note 4.

6.

Id. (noting that almost half of the uninsured population lives in California, Texas,

New York, Florida, and Illinois).
7. Lisa Dubay et al., Advancing Toward Universal Coverage: Are States Able to Take
the Lead?, 7 J. HEALTH C.ARE L. & POL'Y 1.18 (2004).
8. JOHNSON REPORT, supra note 4
9. Seam Park, Substantial Barriers in Illegal Immigrant Access to Publicly-Funded
Health Care: Reasons and Recommendations for Change, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 567, 568

(2004) (noting that illegal immigrants are often prohibited from receiving public health
insurance and are unable to obtain medical insurance through their places of employment
because they often are employed in lox'.-wage, low benefit jobs in the agricultural and
service sectors); see also Julie F. Costich, Legislating a Public Health Nightmare. The AntiImmigrant Provisions of the "Contract with America" Congress, 90 Ky. L.J. 1043, 1057
(2002) (explaining that immigrants are more likely than citizens to be uninsured).
10. Park, supra note 9, at 568.
11. Kiera LoBreglio, The Border Security and Immigration Improvement Act: A Modern
Solution to a Historic Problem?, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 933, 933-34 (2004).
12. See KAISER REPORT, supra note 4. see also JOHNSON REPORT, supra note 4.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See KAISER REPORT, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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11I. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
OFFER No POSITIVE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE
.4. The United States Constitution does not recognize a right to health care.

Although the Declaration of Independence proclaimed that all persons
have the "unalienable" rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, it
did not guarantee these rights. 7 In its original form, the U.S. Constitution
was a framework of government and not a charter of fundamental rights."
The few individual rights outlined in the original document consisted of the
right to a jury trial, the writ of habeas corpus, protection for contracts, and
protection against ex post facto laws.' 9 The Constitution20 did not explicitly
guarantee or promote an individual's right to health care.
During the 1700s, state constitutions guaranteed individual rights for the
most part. -' Large towns throughout the states provided health care for the
indigent and "the protection of health and the provision of care were
assumed to be responsibilities of local and provincial governments." 2 In
return for the individual's obedience, the state had the authority and duty to
protect the public's health through a "social contract. 23 Over time,
however, capitalism and the free-market economy overwhelmed the social
contract and health care was no longer considered a fundamental obligation
of state government. 4
In 1791, the Bill of Rights established the first ten amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. The primary concerns of the Bill of Rights were civil
The
and political rights, rather than social and economic ones. 25
towards
oppression
constitutional guarantees against federal governmental
state actions were the primary insurers of fundamental rights.26 Following
the Civil War, the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments, known as the Reconstruction Amendments, brought federal
\k. Kent Davis, Answering Justice Ginsburg's Charge that the Constitution is
17.
"Skimpy " in Comparison to our InternationalNeighbors. A Comparison of Fundamental
Rights inAmerican and Foreign Law, 39 S. TEX. L. REx. 951, 958 (1998).

18. Id
19. Id
Jason B. Saunders, InternationalHealth Care: Will the United States Ever Adopt
20
Health Care for All?- -4 Comparison Between the Proposed United States Approaches to
Health Care and the Single-Source Financing Systems of Denmark and the Netherlands, 18

21.
22.

L. REV. 711, 719 (1995).
Id. at 718; see also Davis, supra note 17, at 958.
Saunders, supra note 20, at 718-19.

23.
24.
25
26.

Id.
Id. at 719-20.
Davis, supra note 17, at 958-59.
Id. at 959.

SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
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protections against slavery and ensured fundamental rights for all citizens.27
The effect of the Reconstruction Amendments was to give the federal
government the power to supersede state authority when state governments
28
acted independently and in violation of individual fundamental rights.
From this time forward, fundamental rights of U.S. citizens could be
legislated by the authority of Congress.29
In the past fifty years, multiple attempts have been unsuccessfully made
to federally mandate universal health care for all U.S. citizens. 30 The last
attempt occurred in the 1990s, when the Clinton administration proposed
universal health care legislation to Congress, which was unable to secure
enough support.3 1 Previously, Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Nixon, and
Carter all tried to implement health care reform, but failed due to the
strength of countervailing special interests1 2 Thus, the United States
remains one of the only industrialized nations, and the sole remaining
Western democracy, to allow a large "percentage of its population to go
Central to this consistent
entirely without health insurance coverage."
failure of the U.S. Constitution to
position of the U.S. government is the 34
recognize an explicit right to health care.

27.
28.

Id. at 960.
Id.
29. Id. at 960-61.
30. See generally E. Richard Brown, Keynote Address: Allocation of Health Resources
in the Clinton Administration, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 5-8 (1995) (discussing differences
between the Clinton Plan, the Chafee Bill, and the Cooper Bill).
Rory Weiner, UniversalHealth Insurance under State Equal Protection Law, 23 W.
31.
NEW ENG. L. REv. 327, 327 (2002) (stating that some observers believed the health care
system would reform itself through free-market competition, particularly among insurance
companies and health plans); see also Saunders, supra note 20, at 712 (noting that President
Clinton offered a health care reform proposal to Congress which attempted to introduce
health care as a fundamental right offered by market-driven insurance pools and controlled
by a federal agency).
32. Saunders, supra note 20, at 791 & n.46.
33. James B. Roche, Health Care in America: Why We Need UniversalHealth Careand
Why We Need It Now, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1013, 1013 (2001). The author further notes
that the United States is the only industrialized democracy not to have ratified the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which provides that health
care is a fundamental right. Id. at 1015.
34. Anita Pereira, Live and Let Live: Healthcare is a Fundamental Human Right, 3
CoN'N. PuB. INT. L.J. 481, 490 (2004); see also Saunders, supra note 20, at 721-22 (stating
that "The United States recognizes The Charter of the Organization of American States and
the American Convention on Human Rights, but is not a member of the American
Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, a positive rights law which recognizes health care
as a right.").
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B. The United States Supreme Court does not interpret the Constitution to
o/fer a positive right to health care under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Until the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Bill
of Rights to enumerate a list of fundamental rights.35 In 1905, the theory of
substantive due process emerged from the Court's decision in Lochner v.
Newi York,36 which provided for a contemporaneous interpretation of the
Constitution and ultimately led to the expansive list of "fundamental rights
protected by natural law and social compact in addition to those rights listed
in the Bill of Rights. 37
In 1965, the Court further expanded the
interpretation of the Bill of Rights to guarantee fundamental rights from
governmental intrusion.38
In 1973, the Court articulated for the first time that the judicial test for a
fundamental right was "whether there is a right... explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." 39 The text of the Constitution identified
the explicit rights. 40 A standard for determining implicit rights guaranteed
by the Constitution has never been articulated by the Court.4 ' When the
Court determines that the Constitution implicitly guarantees a fundamental
right, it does so by grounding the right in the "liberty" protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 For example, the Court
has held that the Constitution implicitly defines a right to privacy that
encompasses the right to have an abortion,43 use contraception," marry,45
procreate,46 have family relationships,
control the education of one's

35. Davis. supra note 17, at 959.
36. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1908).
37. Davis, supra note 17, at 962 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798)).
38. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
39. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973); see also Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980) (noting that if a law impinges upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution, the law is presumably unconstitutional).
40. Randall S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality
Rights, 17 LAW & INEQ. 239, 260 (1999).
41.
Id. at 261 &n.83.
42. Id. at 262; see also Harris,448 U.S. at 312 & n.18.
43. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
44. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965).
45. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 406 (1978); Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967).
46. Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942).
47. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 499, 505-06 (1977); Prince v. Mass., 321
U.S. 158, 166, 170(1944).
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children,4 8 and maintain bodily integrity. 49
Under fundamental rights analysis, a litigant challenging a governmental
action has the burden of proving that the challenged action infringes upon a
fundamental right. 50 Where the Constitution does not explicitly define an
asserted right, the Court has the freedom to carve out new fundamental
rights. 51
When the Court determines that an implicit fundamental right exists, the
governmental action will only be upheld if the government can show that
the action promotes a compelling state interest. 52 Furthermore, the Court
has held that under a strict scrutiny analysis, the litigant challenging a
governmental action must prove that the governmental action places an
undue burden on the exercise of the individual's fundamental right.53
Under the heightened scrutiny analysis, the Court will find the challenged
governmental action unconstitutional only if the individual's rights have
been unduly burdened by the government action. 54
When the Court determines that a fundamental right does not exist or the
governmental action does not unduly burden an existing fundamental right,
the Court will evaluate the governmental action using the rational basis
test. 55 For a governmental action to be constitutional under this standard,
the action must merely bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest. Under the lesser "mere rationality" standard, the Court has held
that welfare benefits. 57 housing," federal employment, 59 a funded
education,60 and pregnancy-related medical care, 6' including medically
necessary abortions,' 2 are not fundamental rights.63
48. Meyer v.Neb.. 262 U.S. 390,403 (1923).
49. See Wash. v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,
766-67 (1985).
50. Davis, supra note 17, at 967.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315, 326 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 47374 (1977); Bellotti v.Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147-48 (1976).
54. Jeffrey, supra note 40, at 247.
55. Id. at 248.
56. Id. at 247; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40
(1973).
57. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-48 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
58. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
59. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
60. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
61. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977).
62. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 231 (1980).
63. Jeffrey, supra note 40, at 262.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2006

9

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 15 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 7
Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 15

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords
protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of
choice in the context of certain personal decisions, but "does not confer an
entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages
of that freedom., 64 The financial condition of the individual is not created
by the government and cannot be considered an obstacle in the path of
freedom of choice. 65 "Whether freedom of choice that is constitutionally
protected warrants federal subsidization is a question for Congress to
answer, not a matter of constitutional entitlement. 6 6 Thus, the Court has
determined that under due process, the Constitution imposes no obligation
let alone the costs associated
on the States to pay any medical expenses,
67
indigent.
the
of
care
health
the
with
C. The United States Supreme Court does not extend the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth and FourteenthAmendments to recognize a suspect
class based upon wealth.
Government actions that do not impinge on a right or liberty protected by
the Constitution will be presumed valid in the absence of a statutory
classification that is suspect. 68 The Court has held that the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection is not a source of substantive rights or
liberties, but rather a "right to be free from invidious discrimination in
statutory classifications and other governmental activity. '69 When a
government action classifies on the basis of a suspect classification, the
Court has
Court will strictly scrutinize the action.70 In this manner, the
73
72
71
applied strict scrutiny analysis to the classifications of race, ethnicity,
national origin,74 and, when made by a state, legal alienage7. 5
64.

Harris,448 U.S. at 317-18.

65.

Id. at 316.

However,

66. Id. at 318.
67. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 317 (1982) (supporting idea that "a State is under no constitutional duty to provide
substantive services for those within its borders.").
68. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 478; see also Jeffrey, supra note 40, at 248.
69. Harris,448 U.S. at 322.
70. Jeffrey, supra note 40, at 249.
71. Id. at 248 (noting that to satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis, the government action
must further a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved by less intrusive means).
72. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); see also
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978); McLaughlin v. Fla., 379
U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Boiling v, Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
73. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91.
74. See Oyama v. Cal., 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948); see also Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 903,
as recognized in Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
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since the Constitution grants the federal government the power to regulate
naturalization and immigration in Article I § 8 of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has held that alienage classifications by the federal
government merit only deferential scrutiny.7 6 In addition, it should be
noted that alienage is a suspect classification for legal aliens, but not for
illegal aliens." An intermediate level of scrutiny s will be applied to the
80
quasi-suspect classifications of gender 79 and legitimacy.
The Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect
class for purposes of equal protection analysis, although it has
acknowledged that every denial of federal or state funding to an indigent
creates a wealth classification.8 ' The Court stated that "the Constitution
2
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill."
On the other hand, the Court's failure to acknowledge a right to federal
and state funding does not mean it is unsympathetic to the plight of the
indigent.83 A governmental statute may be challenged successfully on equal
protection grounds with proof of purposeful discrimination. In such a case,
one must show that the state legislature "selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part because of its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group." ' Although "laws and regulations allocating welfare
funds involve 'the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings,"' such classification systems may survive equal protection
is shown.85
challenges if a reasonable basis for the classification
75.

Jeffrey, supra note 40, at 249 n.48; see also, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216,

76.
77.
78.
79.

See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1976).
9 82
9
2 9
).
SeePlyerv. Doe, 457U.S. 202. 1 n.1 (1
Jeffrey, supra note 40, at 247
See United States v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 531-34 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.

219 (1984) (stating, "a state law that discriminates on the basis of alienage can be sustained
only if it can withstand strict judicial scrutiny."), but see. e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454
U.S. 432, 438-39 (1982) (noting the public function exception to the general rule that
alienage classifications merit strict scrutiny).

190, 197 (1976).
80.

Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S 456, 461 (1988); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98-99

(1982).
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 n.6 (1977) (noting that "[iun cases such as Griffin
81.
the
v. 11.,351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. Cal., 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court held that
convictions
criminal
of
review
appellate
allow
that
States
requires
Clause
Protection
Equal
These cases are
to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts and appellate counsel.

is
grounded in the criminal justice system, a governmental monopoly in which participation
principles
the
that
clear
it
made
have
Court
the
by
compelled ... [S]ubsequent decisions
underlying Griffin and Douglas do not extend to legislative classifications generally.").
82. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
83.
84.
85.

See id.
Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
U.S. 471, 485
See Maher, 432 U.S. at 479 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397
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The Court's analysis of state or federal legislation related to health care
funding is indistinguishable under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.86
The Court has repeatedly held that "poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect
classification." 87 Congress and state governments may designate classes of
individuals to whom health care funding will be available, once qualified,
as long as governmental action is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. 8
D. The United States Supreme Court holds that prisoners must receive
health care under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.

The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment
proscribes tortures and other "methods of punishment ' 89 and thereby
dictates "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency" to the prisoner population.9" The treatment a
prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined
are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. 9' The Court has held
that punishments that do not comport with the evolving standards of
decency as set by society are repugnant to the Eight Amendment.92 In
addition, punishments that "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain" also violate the Eighth Amendment. 93 The standard of decency
imposes a duty on prison authorities to provide prison inmates with
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, as well as to take
reasonable measures to guarantee prisoners safety. 4
The government is obligated to provide medical care to incarcerated
persons because they rely on prison authorities to meet their medical
needs.9 5 Denial of medical care under such conditions can result in pain
(1970)).
86. Harris N. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (citing Maher, 432 U.S. 464).
87. Id. at 323 (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)).
88. See id. at 326.

89.
90.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
Id. (citing Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).

91

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 31 (1993)).
92. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
93. Id. at 103 (citing Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 173(1976)).
94. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Social Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 198-99 (1989); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
95. Eytelle, 429 U.S. at 103; see Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)
(noting the public is required to care for the prisoner "'who cannot by reason of the
deprivation of his liberty care for himself"); see also City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.,
463 U.S. 239, 242, n.4 (1983) (noting the Eighth Amendment prevails over contrary state
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More serious conditions may produce torturous
and suffering."
circumstances and even death. 7 Thus, the Court has concluded that the
deliberate indifference of serious medical conditions of prisoners
constitutes unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain under the Eighth
Amendment.9 8
"Deliberate indifference" may manifest itself in a prison physician's
response to a prisoner's medical needs or as a result of a prison official
99
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical treatment. An Eighth
Amendment violation based on a prison official's deliberate indifference
requires the inmate to prove something more than mere negligence, but less
very purpose of causing harm
than an act or omission that occurred for the
00
result.'
ould
w
harm
that
knowledge
with
or
The deliberate indifference standard not only requires more than the
prison official's mere knowledge of an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety for liability, but the prison inmate must also prove disregard for an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.' 0 ' The Court's analysis mandates
a subjective inquiry into the prison official's state of mind or
consciousness, 10 2 which requires evidence of knowledge and disregard by
person. 03
that particular prison official, not just a reasonable
Therefore, a prison inmate's guaranteed medical treatment under the
Eighth Amendment must be sufficient to prevent unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain. However, reasonable efforts by prison officials are
sufficient to avoid liability under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
Contrary to an interpretation that the Eighth
of the Eight Amendment."
05
Amendment provides a fundamental right to health care, health care in
this context is neither adequate nor sufficient to meet basic and appropriate
standards of medical care.
law and requires the governmental entity responsible for supplying the prisoner with health
care to pay all relevant costs).
96. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 104.
99. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
100. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976) (noting
that since Eighth Amendment liability does not extend to unforeseeable accidents or
provide
inadvertent failures to provide medical care, prison officials are not required to
immediately to
medical care after failed executions by electrocution but instead may proceed
the second attempt).
101. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Amendment as set
102. Id. at 838 (applying the subjective component of the Eighth
(1991)).
298
294,
U.S.
501
Seiter,
v.
Wilson
in
forth
103. Id. at 842-43 n.8.
(1979)).
104. Id. at 844 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48
490-92.
at
34,
note
supra
105. Pereira,
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E. The United States Supreme Court extends liberty interests via the Due
Process Clause to persons with compromisedfreedoms.
An Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a prisoner's
serious medical needs requires a formal adjudication of guilt that is in
accord with procedural due process of law. °6 Persons who are awaiting
trial or sentencing and require medical care while under government
custody are not protected under this right. Rather, the Court has held that
the proper constitutional provision guaranteeing medical care to the injured
detainee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'° 7
In this context, a person injured in the course of apprehension and
custody by the police has a due process right to appropriate and necessary
medical treatment. ° 8 Although the Court has not defined the parameters of
this right, the Court has clarified that the individual's due process rights are
at least as 0great
as the Eighth Amendment protections available to convicted
9
prisoners.
Similarly, the Court has held that the liberty interests of a mental health
patient involuntarily institutionalized include a clear Fourteenth
Amendment right to "adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care."' 1°
The Appellate Courts have extended such a liberty interest to any special
relationship imposing a duty on a state or municipality "to provide care and
treatment for persons in its custody in situations less extreme than
permanent incarceration or institutionalization.""' A special relationship
exists when the state exercises sufficient control 2to significantly limit a
person's freedom to obtain adequate medical care. "
Therefore, a person with a medical condition will at least be
constitutionally guaranteed minimally adequate medical care if
incarcerated, institutionalized, or otherwise placed under government
control that significantly compromises that person's freedom of access the
106.

City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (citing Ingraham v.

Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 (1977)).
107. Id. at 244.

108.

Id. at 245.

109.

Id. at 244 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)).

110. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
Ill. Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11th Cir. 1987); see
also, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1065 (1989) (holding that when children are involuntarily placed in foster care, the state may
be liable for injuries the child suffers as a result of the foster care); Maddox v. City of L.A.,
792 F.2d 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that medical care must be secured for persons
injured while in police custody); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1096 (1986) (finding that due process requires states to provide
pretrial detainees with at least minimally adequate levels of food, space, and medical care).
112.

Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1036.
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health care system.' 13 Health care in this context reflects Eighth
Amendment standards, which are neither adequate nor sufficient to meet
basic and appropriate standards of medical care and which are contrary to
that the Due Process Clause provides a fundamental right
an interpretation
1 14
to health care.
IV. CONGRESS PROVIDES FEDERAL FUNDING FOR BASIC HEALTH CARE TO

ELIGIBLE PERSONS, EXPLICITLY DENIES FEDERAL FUNDS TO UNQUALIFIED
ALIENS, AND UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES GUARANTEES ACCESS TO
HEALTH CARE TO ALL PERSONS

A. Medicaidprovidesfederalfundingfor basic health care to eligible
persons.
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, commonly known as Medicaid, was
enacted in 1965 as companion legislation to the Medicare program. 1 5 This
need-based program provides low-income individuals 16 broad coverage for
medical expenses including prescription drugs, dental and eye care, and
long-term custodial care in a nursing home or by home care attendants.' 7
Under Medicaid provisions, the federal government and the states share
the cost of providing specified benefits to certain federally specified
categories of needy individuals." 8 Although a state is not required to
participate in Medicaid, its plan must comply with federal statutes and
regulations that state chooses to do so." 9 Compliance requires the state to
designate a Medicaid agency to administer the plan1 20 and submit a "plan
for Medical
assistance" to the Department of Health and Human Services
21
(HHS).1

Upon approval from HHS, the state establishes eligibility standards, sets
113.

Id. at 1035.
Pereira, supra note 34, at 490-92.
115. Lawrence Singer, Gloria Jean Ate Catfood Tonight: Justice and the Social
Compactfor Health Care in America, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 620 (2005).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2003); see generally Toby Golick, Medicare: The Basics,
114.

14TH ANNUAL ELDER LAW"INSTITUTE: BASIC ELDER LA" 99, 101 (2002).

117. Golick, supra note 116, at 101.
118. Diane Rowland, Medicaid: Issues and Challengesfor Health Coverage of the LowIncome Population, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 106, 110 (2004); see also Singer, supra
note 115, at 621 (observing that the federal government currently pays approximately fifty-

seven percent of Medicaid program costs).
119. Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 2001); see Weiner, supra note 31,
at 351.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (2000); see generally Lawrence W. Vemaglia, MASS.
HEALTH & HosP. LAW (2004).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (2003).
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the rate of payment for services, and administers the Medicaid plan. 122 The
federal government then partially reimburses the state for expenditures in
subsidizing medical services provided. 123
At a minimum, the federal government requires that the participating
state provide Medicaid coverage to persons determined to be "mandatory
categorically needy," a group which includes those already receiving some
other need-based government benefit, most commonly Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC).124 Mandatory Medicaid benefits must cover
basic physician, laboratory, and hospital services. 125
The state may elect to expand the scope of persons eligible for Medicaid
coverage in two ways.1 26 First, the group of persons eligible to receive
1 27
Medicaid can be expanded to include the "optional categorically needy.
Individuals in this group are either uniquely vulnerable or in need of
28
medical supervision, including the elderly, the blind, and the disabled.1
This group of individuals may also meet the "income and resource
requirements" for other forms of governmental aid, such as AFDC, even
though they do not receive such assistance. 29 Secondly, a state may extend
Medicaid coverage to the "optional medically needy," persons with higher
income and resources but who otherwise qualify as "optional categorically
needy." 130 The optional Medicaid benefits that these individuals receive
include prescription drug coverage and community-based long term care.131
Medicaid programs provide funding for health services to over fifty
million individuals in the United States and represent the nation's largest
health care program.' 32 Individual state costs associated with running a
Medicaid program and the actual reimbursement rates for the health care
services covered by Medicaid impact the availability of these services. 133 In
2002, optional state programs generated 65% of Medicaid spending and

122. Sarah J. Donnell, An Ill-Advised Cure? Providing Medicaid Benefits to the
Medicare Population,98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1213, 1224 (2004).
123. Lewis, 252 F.3d at 569-70.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (2003).
125. Rowland, supra note 118, at 110.
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I)-(VIII) (2003); see Lewis, 252 F.3d at 570.
127
Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (2003); see Lewis %.Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 570
n.4 (2d (r. 2001) (stating that one group of individuals classified as "optional categorically
needy" are individuals under the age of twenty-one, known as "Ribicoff children," named
after Senator Abraham Ribicoff, who helped to assure their inclusion in Medicaid coverage).
131.
Rowland, supra note 118, at 110.
132. Id. at 106, 109-11.
133.
Singer, supra note 115, at 621-22.
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83% of the optional spending went to the elderly and disabled populations,
the bulk of which was used for long-term care and prescription drug
coverage.134 Overall, children and their parents represent three-quarters of
all beneficiaries and 30% of all spending, while the elderly and disabled
account for a quarter of beneficiaries and 70% of spending. 11 5 State
budgetary constraints dictate the availability of health services coverage and
the number of persons eligible for optional programs.136 As the demands on
Medicaid spending increase, states are forced to restrict Medicaid
providers
expenditures, either by decreasing reimbursement to health care 37
for health care services rendered or by rationing optional benefits. 1
In addition, health care providers, particularly physicians, have little
motivation to care for the Medicaid population because reimbursement rates
for services provided are exceptionally low.' 3 8 Because it reimburses
providers at rates oftentimes below the cost of providing service, Medicaid
is thus considered a negati-e payor. 139 Furthermore, reimbursement to the
health care provider for Medicaid services rendered is often delayed. 4 The
result is that Medicaid beneficiaries do not receive the same level of health
care services enjoyed by Medicare beneficiaries or those with an employerbased health plan.
B. Congress extends funding for health care services to children.
Medicaid has been amended multiple times in the past forty years to
extend coverage to children beyond the standards applicable to adults. 4 '
Those categories of health care services considered optional for adults are
mandatory for qualified persons under the age of twenty-one. 2
Furthermore, Medicaid specifically mandates coverage of all services listed
in special educational and early intervention plans developed for children
134. Rowland, supra note 118. at 115.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 116-17.
137. See id.; see also Singer, supra note 115, at 621.
138. Singer, supra note 115, at 622.
139. Id. at 623.
140. Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 19 (2004); see Sara Rosenbaum et al., Public Health Insurance Design
for Children: The Evolution From Medicaid to SCHIP. I J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 1, 11
(2004).
142. Rosenbaum, supra note 141, at 11 (noting that except for a small number of
medically needy children who "spend down" to eligibility by incurring high health care
costs, all Medicaid enrolled children under the age of twenty-one are entitled to Early and
Periodic Screening Diagnostic and Treatment services, which consists of all immunizations
recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices and all medically
necessary diagnoses and treatments determined as necessary to treat or "ameliorate" a child's
physical and mental health condition).
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with disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 143 In
this regard, Congress intended Medicaid to ensure qualified children access
to a comprehensive health care system. 144
In 1997, Congress further extended federal coverage of health care
services for children that were not otherwise eligible for Medicaid
assistance by enacting the State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)
as a part of the Balanced Budget Act. 145 SCHIP is a federal matching block
grant that emphasizes the importance of federally-subsidized health care for
uninsured children without access to Medicaid.146 Under SCHIP, the state
may augment Medicaid by expanding the scope of children's health care
coverage, operate SCHIP as a separate program and extend coverage to
uninsured children with income above mandatory Medicaid eligibility
levels, or choose a hybrid of the two options."4 7
Despite the umbrella of health care coverage afforded by SCHIP, persons
in the United States under the age of twenty-one are not guaranteed health
149
care.

4

8

First, many eligible children are never enrolled in SCHIP.

Second, individuals may not qualify for SCHIP because of certain
citizenship eligibility criteria, including five-year waiting periods for legal
alien residents.' 5" Furthermore, SCHIP reimbursement schedules pay
health care providers at "below cost,'

5

' effectively limiting access to those

health care providers that have agreed to participate in Medicare and
Medicaid programs.
C. Congress denies federalfundingfor health care services renderedto
"unqualified" aliens.

On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), also
known as the Welfare Reform Act, which created a comprehensive scheme
for determining an alien's eligibility for federal, state and local benefits and
143.
See id. at 15 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400).
144
Id.
145.
42 U.S.C § 1397 (2000); Singer, supra note 115, at 622.
146. Rosenbaum, supra note 141, at 16-17; Singer, supra note 115, at 622 (noting that
SCHIP allocated S40 billion over a ten year period); Dubay et al., supra note 7, at 23 (stating
that all but 16% of low-income uninsured children are now eligible for coverage under either
Medicaid or SCHIP).
147. Rosenbaum, supra note 141, at 17.
148.
Singer, supra note 115, at 623-24; Dubay et al., supra note 7, at 27 (noting that
despite the level of federal and state funding, 23% of all uninsured children and 16% of lowincome uninsured children remain ineligible for one of these programs).
149. Singer, supra note 115, at 623-24.
150. Id.
151.
Id.
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services. 2 The legislative intent behind PRWORA is explicit, as policy
considerations require that "the availability of public benefits not constitute
53
an incentive for immigration to the United States."'1
PRWORA categorizes aliens as being "qualified" or "not qualified" and
then, based on the categorization, specifies the public benefits available to
those aliens.' 5* Congress defines "qualified alien" as an alien who, at the
time he applies for, receives, or attempts to receive a federal public benefit,
is either: (1) an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence; (2)
an alien who is granted asylum, (3) a refugee; (4) an alien who is paroled
into the United States; (5) an alien whose deportation is being withheld; (6)
an alien who is granted conditional entry; or (7) an alien who is a Cuban
55
and Haitian entrant.'
In enacting PRWORA, Congress made a clear statement that the
immigration policy of the United States denies public benefits to all but a
narrowly defined class of immigrants. 56 Furthermore, Congress intended
to deny health, welfare and postsecondary education benefits on the federal,
state, and local levels to aliens who are "not qualified."' 57 PRWORA
provides an exception where all persons, regardless of immigrant status,
may receive federal Medicaid assistance for emergency medical conditions,
immunizations, and testing and treatment of symptoms of communicable
58
diseases.
Yet, Medicaid benefits are available to certain non-citizens. Specifically,
an alien is entitled to Medicaid benefits for health care if the he or she
fulfills the criteria established by the state 5 9 and if the alien is "qualified"
under the provisions of PRWORA. 6 ° States that desire to extend Medicaid
coverage to individuals otherwise "not qualified" may do so at the state's
expense. 6' To do so, PRWORA requires the state to enact legislation after
August 22, 1996, that affirmatively provides state and local benefits to
illegal immigrants considered "not qualified."' 162 Even though state statutes
152.

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.

No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C).
153.

8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(B) (2000).

154. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (C.D.
Cal. 1997).
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2000).
156. League of UnitedLatin Am. Citizens, 997 F. Supp. at 1254.
157. 8 U.S.C. §§ 161 l(c)(1)(B), 1621(b) (2000).
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(b)(1), (3) (2000).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (2000).
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2000).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (2000).
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2000).
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enacting health care programs jointly funded by the federal government
may extend to otherwise "not qualified" aliens, their constitutionality is
analyzed under a rational basis standard because the state has an interest in
both complying 163
with national immigration policy and allocating scarce
public resources.
Alternatively, PRWORA allows the state authority to limit the eligibility
of "qualified" aliens for state public benefits. 64 In practice, however, the
constitutionality of state legislation limiting health care benefits to
individuals "qualified" under the federal scheme will be evaluated under
strict scrutiny and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 65 Furthermore, PRWORA may preempt state statutes that
restrict alien eligibility for public benefits when the application of the state
statute impacts immigration.166

Many illegal immigrants are concerned that federal authorities will
discover their immigration status if they receive federal, state or local
subsidies. 67 State legislation may not preempt access to information
possessed by the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Service 68 regarding the immigration status of an alien in
the United States, whether lawful or unlawful. 169 PRWORA requires that
the United States Attorney General establish procedures by which a state or
local government can verify immigration status 70at the time an alien applies
for a federal, state, or local health care benefits.1
Thus, the impact of PRWORA on aliens "not qualified" for federal
benefits is considerable, as it limits benefits for health care to emergency
medical conditions, immunizations, and treatment for communicable
diseases.' 7' Any state may elect to extend state and local benefits to this
163.

Avila v. Biedess, 78 P.3d 280, 287 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).

164

8 U.S.C. § 1622 (2000).

165. Set, Kurti v. Maricopa County, 33 P.3d 499, 505 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that
under a strict scrutiny analysis, the state statute limiting health care to otherwise "qualified"

aliens who entered the United States after August 22, 1996, to emergency care for a period
of five years, violated the Equal Protection Clause).

166. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1253-55
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the Court articulated
a three part test to determine whether a state statute related to immigration is preempted by
federal law and under that test, the Court determined that the state initiative denying illegal
aliens access to benefits or public services was preempted by PRWORA).
167. Park, supra note 9, at 569-70.

168.

6 1.S.C. § 271-291 (Supp. 112001-2003).

169.
170.

8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2000).
8 U.S.C. § 1642(a)(3) (2000).

171.

Costich, supra note 9, at 1057 (noting that since immigrants are more likely than

citizens to be uninsured, restrictions on eligibility for government-funded health care
coverage impair access to health care for immigrants to a greater extent than to U.S.
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population at the state's sole expense; however, to date only three states
have chosen to do so. 7"2 Furthermore, PRWORA deters access to health
care for illegal immigrants through provisions that potentially initiate
deportation proceedings.113
Alternatively, aliens are constitutionally protected against state statutes
or as-applied limit health care benefits to aliens otherwise
that on their7 face
"qualified."' 4 States that statutorily extend limitations or bar public health
care either through Medicaid or another independent medical assistance
program to otherwise "qualified" indigent aliens will trigger strict scrutiny
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
175
In addition,
which will likely lead to a finding of unconstitutionality.
state statutes that classify aliens by immigration status and then determine
availability of health care benefits based 76upon that classification are
preempted by PRWORA and thus unlawful. 1
D. Congress mandates all persons to receive health care servicesfor an
emergency medical condition.
In 1986, Congress passed the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA), 71 which ensures that all persons have equal access
to emergency medical care, regardless of insurance coverage or the ability
to pay for health care services.) -S Prior to the enactment of EMTALA,
neither state actions nor federal legislation 79 successfully enforced an

citizens).
172. Park, supra note 9, at 592 n.68 (noting that New York, Florida, and New Jersey
provide access for illegal immigrants to state-funded health insurance programs following
enactment of PRWORA Prior to PRWORA, Maine was the only state that granted illegal
immigrants access to state-funded health care services but it discontinued this practice after
PRWORA became effective).
173. Id. at 576.
174. See Op. Conn. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-002 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at
=
http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A 1770&Q=281996.
175. Marjorie A. Shields, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes
Limiting or BarringPublic Health Care to Indigent Aliens, 113 A.L.R. 5 (1995).
176. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1252-53
(C.D.Cal. 1997).
177. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986, 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000).
178. Tiana M. Lee, An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in the Emergency
Medicine Landscape on EMTALA Compliance and Enforcement, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L.
145, 150 (2004).
179. Id. at 146 (noting that states relied on public policy and custom to ensure that
health care providers acknowledged an affirmative duty to provide emergency health care to
all persons until Congress enacted the Hill-Burton Act of 1946); see Sara Rosenbaum &
Brian Kamoie, Finding a Way Through the Hospital Door: The Role of EMTALA in Public
Health Emergencies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 590, 591 (2003) (stating that the Hill-Burton
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affirmative duty of the health care provider to provide health care services
to all persons presenting to an emergency department.' 80 Under the
provisions of EMTALA, hospitals or physicians that fail to meet
appropriate standards for patient care are subject to substantial monetary
penalties assessed by the Office of the Inspector General, possible
termination of Medicare participation imposed by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS), 181 and civil actions by injured plaintiffs or
82
hospitals claiming financial loss from an inappropriate transfer.
Specifically, EMTALA requires a hospital with an emergency
department to provide a medical screening examination to any requesting
individual whether or not that individual is eligible for federal health care
benefits. 83 When the hospital determines the person in the emergency
department has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must either
stabilize the medical condition' 84 or transfer the person to another medical
facility. 85 The Social Security Act defines an emergency medical condition
as a medical condition, including emergency labor and delivery,
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity, including
severe pain, such that the absence of immediate medical attention could
reasonably be expected to result in placing the patient's health in serious
jeopardy, serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of
any bodily organ or part.186
The obligations of a hospital and physician faced with an individual
presenting herself to a qualified emergency department are satisfied under
EMTALA if: (1) the medical screening exam identifies an emergency
medical condition and the person is admitted to the hospital as an in-patient
for further treatment, (2) the medical screening examination fails to identify
an emergency medical condition; (3) the medical screening exam identifies
Act provided federal grants to states for the construction of hospitals and required those
hospitals to: (I) provide services to all persons residing in the area for as long as the entity
existed, known as the community service obligation, (2) maintain an emergency room and
provide emergency services to all persons without regard to an ability to pay; and (3)
participate in Medicare and Medicaid).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 151-52 (indicating that both hospitals and physicians are subject to substantial
civil monetary penalties up to $50,000 for each violation, citing 42 U.S.C. §§
1395dd(d)(1)(A), (B)).
182. Brian Kamoie, EMTA LA Dedicating an Emergency Department Near You, 37 J.
HEALTH L. 41, 45 (2004); see Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1992)
(noting that EMTALA is not a federal malpractice law because negligent care, if
evenhanded, is not considered to be a violation of EMTALA).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (2000).
185.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(B) (2000).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(l)(2000).
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an emergency medical condition that requires transfer to another facility, or
(4) the person requests transfer to another facility. 187 However, the
EMTALA obligation remains with the transferring hospital until arrival at
the receiving hospital.'8" CMS has concluded that the conditions of
participation under Medicare satisfy these EMTALA requirements for
persons admitted to a hospital.'8 9
Thus, EMTALA represents an unfunded mandate for health care
providers to provide limited health care services to every person that
Because
presents to an emergency room and requests treatment. 90
uninsured persons and Medicaid enrollees receive little resistance to entry
under EMTALA, they tend to seek health care services in the emergency
department rather than from a physician's office.' 9' In effect, the hospital
emergency department has become the primary care treatment center or
safety net provider for persons whose insurance status otherwise bars access
to the free market health care system.' 92
V. HEALTH CARE DELIVERY INTHE UNITED STATES HAS EVOLVED FROM
A CHARITY-BASED SYSTEM TO A FREE MARKET SYSTEM WITH FEW TAX
INCENTIVES

A. The United States health care system has traditionallyprovided services
to all persons, despite an inability to pay.
Until the late 1800s, the poor and the sick were cared for in
charitable hospitals. 93 Hospital income was derived largely or entirely
from voluntary charitable donations, not government subsidies, taxes, or
patient fees. 9 4 Generally, patients with sufficient means in need of medical
treatment and their private physicians avoided care in any hospital because

187. Regina S. Rockefeller, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, §
12, in MASS. HEALTH & Hosp. LAW (Mass. Continuing Education 2004).
188. Id.
189. Id. (noting that the governing body of a Medicare participating hospital must ensure
its medical staff has written policies and procedures for appraising emergencies, initial
treatment, and referral (when appropriate), including a discharge planning process that
applies to all patients, reflected in a hospital-wide quality assurance program and medical
staff bylaws).
190. Singer, supra note 115, at 625.
191. Lee, supra note 178, at 166.
192. See Bruce Siegal et al., Health Reform and the Safety Net: Big Opportunities;
Major Risks, 32 J.L. MED. & ET-flcs 426, 427 (2004) (noting that since the passage of
EMTALA, hospital emergency departments have been transformed into safety net providers
for uninsured persons).
193. Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 270 (Utah 1985).
194. Id.
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hospitals had a dual role of caring for the medical problems as well as the
social problems associated with indigence.195
By the 1920s, hospitals transformed from charitable institutions to free
market medical treatment facilities primarily financed by payments from
patients. 9 6 Technical advancements in medical treatment, particularly in
the fields of surgery and anesthesia, produced large increases in the cost of
delivering health care, thus raising hospital budgets accordingly. 197 The
desire to maximize revenues forced hospitals to focus attention on attracting
paying patients and the physicians that served them. 98 Hospitals had "gone
from treating the poor for the sake of charity to treating the rich for the sake
of revenue," while physicians, once prohibited from charging patients for
care provided in hospitals, now routinely charged patients for hospital
services.' 9 Once completed, this "revolution in health care" transformed a
"healing profession" into an "enormous and complex industry, employing
millions of people and accounting for a substantial proportion of our gross
national product.""2"(
Today, delivery of charitable health care services to the uninsured and
indigent is provided by a "safety net" of health care providers. 20 1 Broadly
defined, the "safety net" includes community health centers, public health
department clinics, rural health clinics, free clinics, individual physician
practices that provide health care services to indigent and uninsured
patients, and any for-profit or non-profit hospital with an emergency
department as defined by EMTALA.2 °2 Safety net providers are dependent
upon government financing, typically a blend of Medicaid, federal and state
Share Hospital (DSH) funding, and local taxpayer
grants, Disproportionate
3
support.:0

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 270 n.7.
Id. at270.
Id. at 270 n.9.
Utah County, 709 P.2d at 270 n.9.
Id. at 271

200.

Id. at 272.

201.

Siegel, supra note 192, at 426.

202.
203.

Id.
Id. at 427 (stating that federal Medicaid DSH payments to hospitals in 2003 totaled

approximately $8.6 billion and in 2004 federal grants to community health centers were over
$1.62 billion); see also John D. Blum, Longevity and the Future Challenges of Health
Policy: The Physical Extension of Life May Be the Single Greatest Accomplishment of the
20th Century, 11 EXPERIENCE 4, 8 (2001) (noting there is no unifying regulatory scheme in

health care, but rather a bizarre quilt of federal and state initiatives, that along with the
pressures of the market, work to deliver services and structure the composition and types of
agents that provide health care).
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B. Health care facilities can recoup loses.1fore uncompensatedcare
through non-profit status.
For over one hundred years, federal, state, and local governments have
recognized the importance of awarding hospitals relief from corporate
income and property tax in exchange for providing health care to the poor
and indigent. The rationale is that the shift of the cost to provide free
charity care offsets any loss to the government's revenue. 2c0 Currently, the
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 501(a) provides that federal income tax
exemption applies to "charitable" organizations described in I.R.C. §
501(c)(3). 20 5 Charitable in this context "reflects the common law and the
substantial value accorded to nonprofit care for the sick." 2'" The Internal
Revenue Service (I.R.S.) in its 1969 Revenue Ruling 69-545 recognized the
"promotion of health" as a charitable purpose when a "community benefit"
standard is met. 2 ' To date. the I.R.S. has not quantified the amount of
charity care a hospital must provide to meet this standard.20 8
A hospital's federal income tax exemption status under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) does not automatically guarantee property tax exemptions under
state and local laws.: ' In addition, federal law does not require property
tax exemption by state law in order to satisfy provisions of I.R.C. §
501(c)(3).2" 0 However, most states look to the language of I.R.C. §
501(c)(3) when determining if any given hospital satisfies the charitable
The federal
contribution required to receive property tax relief.21
government's relaxed standards on the amount of charity care required by a

204. Gabriel 0. Aitsebaomo, The Nonprofit Hospital: A Call for New National
Guidance Requiring Minimum Annual Charity Care to Qualify for Federal Tax Exemption,
26 CAMPBELL L.RE%. 75, 75-76 (2004).
205. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (providing for the exemption from federal income tax of
corporations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or
educational purposes, provided no part of the organization's net earnings inures to the

benefit of any private shareholder or individual).
206. Jack Burns, Are Nonprofit Hospitals Really Charitable?: Taking the Question to
the State and Local Level, 29 J. CORP. L. 665, 678 (2004).
207. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; see also Bums, supra note 206, at 667.
208. Neville M. Bilimoria, Patients Challenge Nonprofit Hospital's Charitable-Care
Practices, 93 ILL. B.J. 134, 135 (2005); see also Standards for Tax-Exemption, CCH
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE PROFESSIONAL'S MANUAL 20, 870 (2005) (requiring hospitals to

operate in charitable manner and maintain relationships, practices, and agreements that do
not result in private interests).
209. Bilimoria, supra note 208, at 136.
210. Id.
211. Marilyn E. Phelan, Reorganization of Nonprofit Hospitals-Exemption from
Property Taxes, in NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS AND ASSOCIATIONS §

21:17 (2005).
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hospital to qualify for tax exemption impacts state and local governments
through loss of property tax revenue. 2
Estimates indicate that nonprofit
hospitals in the United States currently receive exemptions 2of
over four
billion dollars for each federal, state, and local tax jurisdictions. 13
C. Federaland state governments provide incentivesfor physician
volunteerism.
Reflective of a social contract, approximately two-thirds of all physicians
provide charity care.21 4 Yet, federal, state and local governments do not
consider physician health care providers for tax incentives similar to those
afforded to hospital entities under nonprofit status when providing charity
care. Only Virginia recognizes physician tax credits for the delivery of free
health care services in a nonprofit health care facility, which are based on
Medicaid reimbursement schedules and are not to exceed $125 per hour.2 15
Since the 1960s, federal and state governments have enacted legislation
to provide financial incentives and relief from medical malpractice liability
for physicians who have volunteered their services in underserved areas or
to designated charitable activities.216 Financial incentives took the form of
increased reimbursement for practice in underserved areas, cancellation of
loans to physicians that serve in those areas, loans and grants to establish
and maintain clinics, subsidy of medical malpractice insurance, money
given to rural hospitals and communities to attract and retain physicians,
and state assistance for resident training in primary care fields.217
In 1997, Congress passed the Volunteer Protection Act (VPA), which
protects all volunteers working for nonprofit organizations or other
government entities from liability for certain harms caused by their acts or
omissions during the course of service.21 8 Under the VPA, physician

212. Bums, supra note 206, at 679.
213.
Gary J. Young, Federal Tax-Exemption Requirements for Joint Ventures Between
Nonprofit Hospital Providers and For-ProfitEntities: Form Over Substance?, 13 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 327, 329 (2004).
214. Paul Harris, Overcoming Barriers to Physician Volunteerism: Summary of State
Law Providing Reduced Malpractice Liability Exposure for Clinician Volunteers, 2004 U.
ILL. L. REv. 167, 1034 (2004); see also Louis Lasagna, The Hippocratic Oath - Modem
Version (1964), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oathmodem.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2005).

215. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-2004 (2004).
216. Kristine M. Byrnes, Is There a Primary CareDoctor in the House? The Legislation
Needed to Address a NationalShortage, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 808-27 (1994).
217. Id. at 822-24.
218. Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505 (2000); see also
Hattis, supra note 214, at 178.
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immunity extends to acts of simple negligence 1 9 and limits gross
negligence to acts proven by clear and convincing evidence of willful and
wanton conduct. -20 Although the VPA preempts state law from offering
fewer protections, the VPA allows states to enact legislation providing
physicians with greater protections. -'
Thus, a physician doing business in the free market of health care
receives no tax benefit or relief from medical malpractice liability when
providing "routine" charitable care to the uninsured or Medicaid patient.
On the contrary, the current general climate of low physician
reimbursement rates, rising overhead costs, and rising malpractice
premiums has fueled certain entrepreneurial activities on the part of
physicians. Many primary care physicians have chosen to limit their
practice to insured patients that pay an additional retainer fee for "concierge
Specialist physicians,
care," also known as "boutique medicine. 22
particularly in the fields of cardiac care, neurosurgery, and orthopedics have
financed specialty care hospitals. 22 3 Such specialty care facilities have
produced large financial returns for physician investors while selectively
providing health care services to insured patients.22 4 Furthermore, specialty
care hospitals lack an emergency department and are not required to
provide treatment for emergency medical conditions under EMTALA.
VI. THE FOUNDATION OF THE UNITED STATES HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

Universal health care is best defined as equal access to equal quality
health care services by all individuals. Arguably, every person with
sufficient funds in the United States has an equal protection right of access
to all health care services. Access to the health care system is directly
dependent upon access to sufficient funds.225 The foundation of the U.S.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a) (2000).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(e) (2000).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 14502(a) (2000).
222. Jennifer Russano, Is Boutique Medicine a New Threat to American Health Care or
a Logical Way of Revitalizing the Doctor-PatientRelationship, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
313 (2005) (explaining that the yearly retainer fee may range from $1000 to $20,000, with
the physician continuing to bill and collect for health care services for which he would
normally bill and collect).
223. David Armstrong, Skillful Operation:A Surgeon Earns Riches, Enmity By Plucking
Profitable Patients, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2005, at Al (noting that approximately 100
specialty hospitals are currently in operation. In 2003, Congress imposed an eighteen-month
ban on new specialty hospitals resulting from concerns of the American Hospital Association
that they were cherry-picking the most profitable patients. The ban expired June 8, 2005 and
Congress is debating whether to extend it).
224. Id.
225. Robert F. Rich, Health Policy, Health Insuranceand the Social Contract,21 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 397, 414 (2000) (noting that per capita expenditures have increased from
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health care system as embodied by the U.S. Constitution, Supreme Court
jurisprudence, state constitutions, and federal and state statutes will never
support universal health care funding under such strict a definition for the
following reasons:
I) The Constitution does not explicitly identify health care as a
fundamental right. The impact of this omission is to subject all
federal and state legislation to a mere rationality standard, thereby
allowing denial of health care funding to classes of individuals based
upon wealth and immigration status. Only an amendment to the
Constitution or ratification of a binding international treaty would
result in changing this position, and the likelihood of such an
outcome is remote. 26
2)

For over two hundred years, the Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as not explicitly or
impliedly providing an individual a fundamental right to health care.
The Court can be expected in the future to remain unchanged in its
position that social and economic rights are not fundamental. 27

3)

Congress has the prerogative of qualifying individuals for federal
health care funding. Theoretically, federal funding for health care
could be extended to all qualified persons as a single-payor system
replacing Medicaid and traditional employer-based health insurance.
"Socialization" of health care is widely criticized because it is
inconsistent with the free market and freedom to contract
ideology. 228
Furthermore, government-run programs have the
potential to increase cost, diminish options for access, and
compromise quality of care.229 A federally-funded single-payor
health care system would not provide funding to millions of

S341

in 1970, to S1052 in 1980, to $2589 in 1990, to $4094 in 1998, representing an
increase of 63% between 1990 and 1998).

226. Davis, supra note 17, at 952 n.4 (indicating that Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg
stated that any attempt to amend the Constitution to include fundamental rights such as
housing, employment, and health care would create a "far more stunning" defeat than the
Equal Rights Amendment for women, which failed in the 1980s).
227. Id. at 964.
228. Carolyn V. Juarez, Liberty, Justice, and Insurance for All: Re-Imaging the
Employment-Based Health Insurance System, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 881, 9001 (2004);

see also Dubay et al., supra note 7, at 8 (noting that the single-payor strategy would likely be
a lengthy, uphill battle in the United States, as it has been defeated many times in the past
and would certainly meet fierce resistance from a wide array of influential interest groups).
229. Juarez, supra note 228, at 900-01.
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individuals currently "not qualified" based upon immigration status,
under current federal immigration policy and PRWORA.
4) State governments could extend health care coverage to all persons
within their borders, even illegal immigrants, by way of health care
legislation or a state constitutional amendment that recognizes health
care as a fundamental right.23 ° Such legislation would pass mere
rationality analysis because the state has a legitimate goal of
promoting the health and welfare of its citizens. Undoubtedly,
however, resource allocation to social programs would certainly
prohibit such action. 23 1 Moreover, state-based universal coverage is
inherently unfair because the burden of providing state health care
funding is unequally dispersed amongst the states, placing the
greatest impact on the taxpayers of the state with the greatest
proportion of uninsured and Medicaid patients.
In lieu of universal health care, the uninsured and underinsured in this
country currently rely on Congress to guarantee: (i) access to health care
services for emergency medical care under EMTALA; (ii) tax incentives to
non-profit hospitals for providing charitable care; (iii) financial incentives
for physicians and protection from malpractice liability in the provision of
health care services in underserved areas; and (iv) federal, state and local
funding for safety net providers, including community health centers and
public hospitals. These assurances represent the "social contract," the
agreement that the government will provide certain benefits to its citizens in
return for tax-based financing of these benefits.232
VII. CONCLUSION
Universal health care cannot be achieved in the United States due to the
strength and complexity of the current health care system. The obstacles to
change are substantial; health care is not a fundamental right by
230. Weiner, supra note 31, at 333-34 (2002) (reporting that six states - Alaska, Hawaii,
Michigan, North Carolina, New York, and Wyoming - have constitutional provisions
requiring the legislature to promote and protect the public health. None of these states have
interpreted such provision to mean that the state must expand access to health care for the
uninsured or underinsured).
231. id. at 367 (noting that the state has primarily a financial interest in distributing
health care resources unequally because its ability to help the uninsured is limited). See also
Carol S. Weissert, Promise and Perils of State-Based Road to Universal Health Insurance in
the US., 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 42, 65-66 (2004) (stating that all fifty states and the
District of Columbia have implemented Medicaid cost containment measures to account for
budgetary difficulties).
232. Rich, supra note 225, at 397.
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constitutional language or judicial interpretation, Congress will not rescind
immigration policy, and state fiscal budgets are insufficient to provide for
distribution of limited state funds. But that is not to say that future
legislation cannot have as its intent and effect greater access of the
uninsured and Medicaid patient to preventive or non-emergency care.
Federal and state health care funding currently directed to persons that
qualify under a need-based formula could be expanded to provide basic
health care services to a greater portion of low-wage working persons and
their immediate families. To do so would still leave millions of persons
with unequal access to the health care system due to immigration status or
resistance by health care providers in providing services at undesirable
reimbursement rates.
Future legislation must provide incentives for
physicians in the free market to provide health care service in order to
effectively break down the barriers to health care access faced by persons
whose coverage reimburses service providers at rates lower than those
scheduled by Medicare and those that do not have insurance at all.
Without appropriate incentives, physicians will continue to resist
providing charitable care on a voluntary basis. Physician health care
providers are the cornerstone of preventive and non-emergency health care.
The physician has a choice whether or not to provide health care services to
persons without insurance or Medicaid coverage. Although the U.S. health
care system evolved from a charity-based system, the free market as it
exists provides few substantial incentives for physicians to provide charity
care.
From my perspective, physician health care services provided at
reimbursement rates less than Medicare rates are considered a "negative
payor" and thereby constitute charity care. In exchange for such charitable
services, a physician could receive incentives similar to the tax
considerations given to non-profit facilities that provide charity care to the
uninsured patient or to Medicaid under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). One method of
doing so would require physicians providing such services to electronically
bill the state Medicaid agency as per protocol. The "charitable portion"
would then be calculated from a scheduled Medicare reimbursement rate
less the actual payment received. The physician would then be allowed a
federal tax incentive, either in the form of a credit or deduction, which
could be applied against his/her personal federal income tax responsibility
for that year in which the charitable care was provided.23 3
Furthermore, protections provided to physicians under the VPA should
be extended to all health care services for the Medicaid and uninsured
233. Physician tax incentives for charitable care and potential ideas for future legislation
is the focus of a future article.
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patient. Physicians should be protected from liability for certain harm
caused by acts or omissions while providing "routine" charitable care.
Such legislation would not only further encourage physicians to provide
charity care on a routine basis, but also proffer relief from the rising
overhead of medical malpractice premium rates by sharing liability with the
federal government.
Universal health care for all persons may not be a fundamental right in
the United States, but physical access to health care services is fundamental.
Opportunity remains within the existing U.S. health care system to break
down the economic barriers to health care services experienced by the
uninsured and Medicaid populations.
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